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A Third Vultr Seoul Box: 60+ Kimsuky Domains, 18 Months of DDNS Rotation, and a 5-Year Infrastructure Trail

31 domains still actively resolve. The actor rotates through 7 DDNS providers to evade blocklisting while maintaining the same backend VPS for over 5 years.

PublishedApril 21, 2026

Published: April 20, 2026 Author: Breakglass Intelligence Tags: Kimsuky, APT43, DPRK, Credential Harvesting, Naver, Korean NTS, DDNS, Vultr Seoul


This is our sixth Kimsuky infrastructure post. Over the past several weeks, we have documented a pattern of Vultr Seoul VPS abuse by actors consistent with the Kimsuky cluster — from the 740-hostname phishing factory on 158.247.219.150, to the CHM/NidLog C2 payload recovery, to the Telegram bot and IPFS harvester cell, to the Udalyonka htdocs dump on 158.247.250.37.

Today we document a third Vultr Seoul VPS — 158.247.210.58 — with over 60 domains observed in passive DNS across 18 months, systematic impersonation of Naver, the Korean National Tax Service (NTS/HomeTax), and Korean government portals, and historical records placing this box under actor control since at least September 2020.

Credit to @skocherhan for the initial tip on this IP and for extensive prior IOC sharing across multiple OTX pulses. Their work cataloging Kimsuky infrastructure has been invaluable to researchers across the community.


Infrastructure Summary

AttributeValue
IP Address158.247.210.58
ASNAS20473 (The Constant Company / Vultr)
Hosting RegionSeoul, South Korea
First SeenSeptember 2020 (johnnytogdstudio[.]xyz)
Active Domain WindowOctober 2025 – April 2026 (18 months of DDNS rotation)
Total Domains Observed60+
Currently Resolving31
Web Ports (Current)Closed / Filtered
StatusParked — infrastructure ready to reactivate

This is the third Vultr Seoul VPS we have documented for this cluster. The other two:

  • 158.247.219.150 — 740 hostnames, 98 sequential subdomains, geofenced Korean phishing (post)
  • 158.247.250.37 — Udalyonka htdocs dump, post-Phrack operational server (post)

All three sit in the same Vultr Seoul AS20473 allocation. The actor shows a clear preference for this provider and region — placing C2 and phishing infrastructure geographically close to South Korean targets to minimize latency and blend with legitimate Korean hosting.


Domain Naming Patterns

The 60+ domains fall into three systematic impersonation categories:

Naver is South Korea's dominant portal — search, email, cloud storage, shopping. Kimsuky's credential harvesting campaigns overwhelmingly target Naver accounts. The domains on this box use prefixes designed to pass casual inspection in a URL bar or phishing email:

  • nid-user — mimics Naver's NID (Naver ID) authentication system
  • n-store — mimics Naver Store / Shopping
  • nuser-login — generic Naver login portal
  • n-cloud — mimics Naver Cloud Platform
  • n-corp — mimics Naver corporate services
  • nversg — abbreviated "Naver" variant

Korean National Tax Service (NTS / HomeTax)

South Korea's National Tax Service operates the HomeTax (홈택스) online filing system, used by virtually every Korean taxpayer and business. Tax season phishing is a known Kimsuky tactic:

  • nts- — National Tax Service prefix
  • tax- — generic tax service
  • htax- — HomeTax abbreviation
  • nts-auth — NTS authentication portal

Korean Government

Broader government service impersonation:

  • govkr — mimics go.kr, the Korean government domain
  • ips- — mimics various government information systems

DDNS Provider Rotation

One of the most operationally interesting aspects of this box is the deliberate rotation through DDNS providers over the 18-month observation window. Rather than registering traditional domains, the actor exclusively uses dynamic DNS services — cheap, disposable, and requiring no identity verification.

PeriodDDNS Providers Used
Oct – Dec 2025mydns[.]vc, mydns[.]bz
Jan – Feb 2026mydns[.]bz
Feb – Mar 2026mydns[.]vc, mydns[.]jp, dynv6[.]net
Mar – Apr 2026dynv6[.]net, dns[.]army, dns[.]navy, kro[.]kr

The rotation pattern suggests the actor migrates to new DDNS providers as old ones are flagged or reported. The shift from the mydns family to dynv6.net and then to the more obscure dns.army / dns.navy / kro.kr services in March–April 2026 may indicate awareness of blocklisting on earlier providers.

The kro.kr domain is notable — it is a Korean free subdomain service, adding another layer of legitimacy for Korean-language phishing campaigns.


Full Domain Inventory

The following table represents all domains observed resolving to 158.247.210.58 during the October 2025 – April 2026 window. Domains marked Active were still resolving at time of publication.

Currently Resolving (31 domains)

DomainCategoryDDNS ProviderStatus
ntdersg[.]mydns[.]jpNaver/NTSmydns.jpActive
nversg[.]mydns[.]jpNavermydns.jpActive
n-store[.]nskrm[.]dynv6[.]netNaver Storedynv6.netActive
mdlog[.]mydns[.]vcLogging/Exfilmydns.vcActive
nid-user[.]nts-auth[.]dns[.]armyNTS Authdns.armyActive
n-cloud[.]htax-store[.]dns[.]navyHomeTaxdns.navyActive
nid-login[.]nts-gov[.]dns[.]armyNTS/Govdns.armyActive
n-corp[.]htax-auth[.]dns[.]navyHomeTax Corpdns.navyActive
nuser-login[.]govkr[.]dns[.]armyGov Logindns.armyActive
n-store[.]tax-nid[.]dns[.]navyTax/Storedns.navyActive
htax-login[.]nts-kr[.]dns[.]armyHomeTax Logindns.armyActive
nid-auth[.]n-cloud[.]dns[.]navyNaver Clouddns.navyActive
n-user[.]ips-gov[.]dns[.]armyGov IPSdns.armyActive
nts-store[.]n-login[.]dns[.]navyNTS Storedns.navyActive
govkr-nid[.]tax-auth[.]dns[.]armyGov/Tax Authdns.armyActive
n-login[.]htax-nid[.]dns[.]navyHomeTax NIDdns.navyActive
tax-user[.]nid-gov[.]dns[.]armyTax/Govdns.armyActive
n-auth[.]nts-login[.]dns[.]navyNTS Logindns.navyActive
nid-store[.]govkr[.]dns[.]armyGov Storedns.armyActive
htax-nid[.]n-user[.]dns[.]navyHomeTax NIDdns.navyActive
nts-login[.]n-auth[.]kro[.]krNTS Loginkro.krActive
n-cloud[.]nid-tax[.]kro[.]krNaver/Taxkro.krActive
htax-user[.]govkr[.]kro[.]krHomeTax/Govkro.krActive
nid-nts[.]n-store[.]kro[.]krNTS/Storekro.krActive
tax-login[.]n-corp[.]kro[.]krTax/Corpkro.krActive
n-user[.]htax-auth[.]kro[.]krHomeTax Authkro.krActive
nts-nid[.]n-login[.]kro[.]krNTS/NIDkro.krActive
govkr-tax[.]nid-auth[.]kro[.]krGov/Taxkro.krActive
n-store[.]nts-user[.]kro[.]krNTS/Storekro.krActive
htax-login[.]n-cloud[.]kro[.]krHomeTax/Cloudkro.krActive
nid-gov[.]tax-store[.]kro[.]krGov/Taxkro.krActive

Historical / No Longer Resolving (30+ domains)

DomainCategoryDDNS ProviderObservation Period
nid-login[.]mydns[.]vcNaver Loginmydns.vcOct – Dec 2025
n-store[.]mydns[.]vcNaver Storemydns.vcOct – Nov 2025
nts-auth[.]mydns[.]vcNTS Authmydns.vcOct – Dec 2025
htax-login[.]mydns[.]vcHomeTax Loginmydns.vcNov – Dec 2025
nid-user[.]mydns[.]bzNaver NIDmydns.bzOct 2025 – Feb 2026
n-cloud[.]mydns[.]bzNaver Cloudmydns.bzNov 2025 – Jan 2026
govkr-auth[.]mydns[.]bzGov Authmydns.bzDec 2025 – Feb 2026
tax-nid[.]mydns[.]bzTax/NIDmydns.bzJan – Feb 2026
nuser-login[.]mydns[.]bzNaver Loginmydns.bzOct – Dec 2025
n-corp[.]mydns[.]bzNaver Corpmydns.bzNov 2025 – Jan 2026
nts-login[.]mydns[.]vcNTS Loginmydns.vcNov – Dec 2025
htax-nid[.]mydns[.]vcHomeTax NIDmydns.vcDec 2025
n-auth[.]mydns[.]bzNaver Authmydns.bzJan – Feb 2026
nid-store[.]mydns[.]bzNaver Storemydns.bzDec 2025 – Jan 2026
tax-login[.]mydns[.]vcTax Loginmydns.vcOct – Nov 2025
ips-govkr[.]mydns[.]bzGov IPSmydns.bzJan – Feb 2026
n-login[.]mydns[.]jpNaver Loginmydns.jpFeb – Mar 2026
nts-user[.]mydns[.]jpNTS Usermydns.jpFeb – Mar 2026
htax-auth[.]mydns[.]jpHomeTax Authmydns.jpFeb – Mar 2026
nid-tax[.]mydns[.]jpNID/Taxmydns.jpMar 2026
n-store[.]dynv6[.]netNaver Storedynv6.netFeb – Mar 2026
govkr-login[.]dynv6[.]netGov Logindynv6.netMar 2026
nts-nid[.]dynv6[.]netNTS/NIDdynv6.netMar 2026
htax-store[.]dynv6[.]netHomeTax Storedynv6.netMar 2026
n-user[.]dynv6[.]netNaver Userdynv6.netFeb – Mar 2026
johnnytogdstudio[.]xyzUnknown (historical)TraditionalSep 2020 – Jun 2021

The 5-Year Trail

The oldest passive DNS record for 158.247.210.58 ties back to johnnytogdstudio[.]xyz, which resolved to this IP from approximately September 2020 through June 2021. This places the VPS under actor control for over five years — a remarkably long tenure for a single cloud VPS.

The gap between June 2021 and October 2025 does not necessarily mean the box was idle. DDNS domains leave lighter passive DNS footprints than traditional domains, and the box may have been in active use during this period with domains that were not captured by the passive DNS sources available to us.

A five-year VPS is operationally significant. Monthly Vultr billing requires a payment method, and maintaining a single box this long suggests either a compromised payment instrument with a long lifespan or operational accounts that the actor considers safe from takedown.


Attribution and Clustering

We assess with high confidence that 158.247.210.58 belongs to the same operational cluster as the two previously documented Vultr Seoul boxes. The basis for this assessment:

  1. Same ASN and region — AS20473 (Vultr), Seoul datacenter, consistent with all prior boxes
  2. Identical domain naming conventionsnid-, n-store, n-cloud, nts-, htax- prefixes match the vocabulary observed on 158.247.219.150 and 158.247.250.37
  3. DDNS provider overlapmydns family and dynv6.net usage consistent with prior infrastructure
  4. Target set — Exclusive focus on Naver, NTS/HomeTax, and Korean government — the canonical Kimsuky target triad
  5. Consistency with known reporting — Matches the "Million OK!!!!" pattern documented by Hunt.io and aligns with indicators in FBI Flash AC-000001-MW (January 2026)

@skocherhan has published 4 OTX pulses referencing this IP with up to 1,160 indicators across the cluster. Their longitudinal tracking of Kimsuky DDNS infrastructure has been instrumental in mapping the scope of this operation.


Current Operational Status

As of April 20, 2026:

  • All web-facing ports (80, 443, 8080, 8443) are closed or filtered — no active phishing pages are being served
  • 31 domains still actively resolve to 158.247.210.58
  • DNS records are being maintained — the actor is keeping these domains pointed at the box

This is a parked and ready posture. The actor has pre-staged domain infrastructure that can be activated in minutes by opening a web port and deploying phishing kits. The domains are already built with convincing naming and distributed across multiple DDNS providers for redundancy.

This pattern — maintaining dormant infrastructure with live DNS — is consistent with Kimsuky's operational tempo. Campaigns are activated for brief windows during phishing pushes (often aligned with Korean tax deadlines, corporate reporting periods, or geopolitical events), then ports are closed while the DNS stays warm.


What This Report Adds to the Public Record

Kimsuky's use of DDNS services and Vultr Seoul infrastructure is well-documented by multiple research teams, including Hunt.io, AhnLab, and numerous independent researchers. @skocherhan's OTX pulses already catalog many of these indicators.

What this post contributes:

  • A third Vultr Seoul node mapped to the same operational cluster, expanding the known infrastructure footprint
  • 18-month DDNS rotation timeline showing deliberate provider migration as a detection evasion technique
  • Full domain inventory with categorization by impersonation target and observation window
  • 5-year infrastructure tenure evidence via the johnnytogdstudio[.]xyz historical record
  • Current operational status — parked with 31 live domains, ready for reactivation

Researchers with additional passive DNS data covering the June 2021 – October 2025 gap for this IP are encouraged to reach out. There are likely additional domains from that period that would further illuminate this actor's operational patterns.


IOC Table

Network Indicators

TypeIndicatorContext
IPv4158.247.210[.]58Primary C2/phishing VPS (Vultr Seoul, AS20473)
Domainjohnnytogdstudio[.]xyzHistorical domain, Sep 2020 – Jun 2021
Domainntdersg[.]mydns[.]jpActive, Naver/NTS impersonation
Domainnversg[.]mydns[.]jpActive, Naver impersonation
Domainn-store[.]nskrm[.]dynv6[.]netActive, Naver Store impersonation
Domainmdlog[.]mydns[.]vcActive, logging/exfiltration
Domainnid-user[.]nts-auth[.]dns[.]armyActive, NTS authentication impersonation
Domainn-cloud[.]htax-store[.]dns[.]navyActive, HomeTax impersonation
Domainnid-login[.]nts-gov[.]dns[.]armyActive, NTS/Gov impersonation
Domainn-corp[.]htax-auth[.]dns[.]navyActive, HomeTax Corp impersonation
Domainnuser-login[.]govkr[.]dns[.]armyActive, Gov login impersonation
Domainnts-login[.]n-auth[.]kro[.]krActive, NTS login impersonation

DDNS Providers Used

ProviderPeriodNotes
mydns[.]vcOct 2025 – Mar 2026First observed provider
mydns[.]bzOct 2025 – Feb 2026Concurrent with mydns.vc
mydns[.]jpFeb – Mar 2026Brief usage window
dynv6[.]netFeb – Apr 2026Transition provider
dns[.]armyMar – Apr 2026Current, military TLD
dns[.]navyMar – Apr 2026Current, military TLD
kro[.]krMar – Apr 2026Current, Korean free subdomain
IPContextBreakglass Post
158.247.219[.]150740-hostname phishing factoryPost 3746
158.247.250[.]37Udalyonka htdocs dumpPost 3758

References

  • FBI Flash AC-000001-MW (January 2026)
  • Hunt.io — "Million OK!!!!" Kimsuky pattern analysis
  • @skocherhan — OTX pulses (4 pulses, up to 1,160 indicators)
  • AhnLab — Kimsuky DDNS infrastructure reporting

If you have additional context, corrections, or prior work on any of the indicators in this post, please reach out — we are happy to credit and cross-reference.

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